Hizbullah’s Promise by Alagha, J.
Society & the State
J O S E P H  A L A G H A
Hizbullah’s Promise
In the aftermath of August 2006, belief 
that war had simply “erupted” because 
of a few captured soldiers was shaken. 
Israel’s insistence that its actions were 
legitimate “defensive” responses to Hiz-
bullah’s kidnapping of two soldiers lost 
its credibility triggering suspicion that 
it served as a pretext for launching a 
long-planned war intended to under-
mine Hizbullah’s influence as both a 
militant and democratic political play-
er. Notwithstanding, Israel seriously misjudged its own capacity and 
Hizbullah’s strength. Likewise, Hizbullah committed a strategic mistake 
in miscalculating the intensity of Israeli response, apparently assuming 
that holding Israeli soldiers would ultimately lead to a swap operation 
with Lebanese prisoners. Acknowledging misjudgement, Nasrallah 
later stated that the soldiers would not have been kidnapped if the 
devastating outcome were foreseen.
Although the origins of war should not be reduced to the prisoner 
question, their importance in processes of legitimation highlights 
the symbolic significance of prisoners for both parties. By attempting 
to take or liberate prisoners, both aimed not only to display military 
power, but also to demonstrate commitment to their populations. Un-
derstandably then, the destruction of Lebanon resulted in a victory for 
Hizbullah. Indeed, though some Lebanese question the wisdom of Hiz-
bullah’s action, nevertheless 
Hizbullah emerged from this 
crisis much more popular 
than before.
Promises and
deliveries
While Hizbullah’s kid-
napping of Israeli soldiers 
should in part be seen as a 
gesture of support to the In-
tifada after the June Israeli 
incursion into Gaza, it was 
also prominently related 
to some morally charged 
statements Nasrallah had 
made six years earlier. He 
had made a public “faithful 
promise”: “We are people 
who don’t leave their prison-
ers behind.” Pragmatically, 
then, the kidnapping aimed 
at liberating Lebanese pris-
oners of war in Israeli jails. 
Moreover, by acting on the 
prisoner question, Hizbul-
lah reinforced its status as 
a militant Islamic resist-
ance movement, one which 
seemed to be shaken by its 
participation in the demo-
cratic political process. 
Undoubtedly, the Israeli response was devastating. Israel imposed 
a triple blockade on Lebanon virtually isolating the country from 
the outside world. Large parts of Lebanon’s infrastructure were 
destroyed and its economy came to an almost standstill. The war 
resulted in more than one million displaced, 1300 dead, and 3000 
wounded. By attacking Christian areas Israel plausibly aimed at sow-
ing a wedge between the Lebanese and Hizbullah, in order for Hiz-
bullah to be blamed for the misfortunes that befell Lebanon. Israel 
repeatedly stated that its war targeted Hizbullah and not the Leba-
nese population. 
However, inside Lebanon few blame 
Hizbullah for the misfortunes. Instead, 
Hizbullah emerged as the hero of re-
construction. Soon after the ceasefire, 
Hizbullah’s civil institutions spearhead-
ed relief efforts and started rebuilding 
damaged homes. While the Lebanese 
state is considered too fragile and cor-
rupt to deal efficiently with the de-
struction, Hizbullah is well renowned 
for its probity and integrity in conduct-
ing public affairs. Indeed, Hizbullah honoured its words and delivered 
on its promises of handing out cash donations to all of those whose 
homes have been partially or completely destroyed. 
Attempting to defuse the crisis, the Lebanese cabinet—including its 
two Hizbullah ministers—unanimously endorsed PM Sanyura’s seven 
points, one of which mentions that the state enjoys absolute monopoly 
over the use of force; a proposition that Hizbullah had persistently re-
sisted. Moreover, after its rejection of the UN draft resolution because 
it fell short of demanding an Israeli withdrawal, and in an attempt to 
influence the wording of the new resolution to Lebanon’s advantage, 
the cabinet unanimously approved deploying Lebanese soldiers to the 
border region with Israel. This seemed to constitute a genuine policy 
shift rather than a rhetorical move since Hizbullah’s earlier discourse 
had vetoed sending the army to the south. The cabinet also approved 
the 2006 UNSC Resolution 1701, which calls, among other things, for 
the cessation of hostilities and Hizbullah’s disarmament, by a political 
process, rather than by military force, as Kofi Annan clarified. In these 
decisions, Hizbullah’s two ministers voted “yes”. Nasrallah asserted that 
accepting the deployment of the army to the south (a repeated Israeli 
demand) would “serve national interest since the strength of Lebanon 
is in its resistance and national unity.” This policy targeting more na-
tional integration and Lebanonization, aims at portraying Hizbullah as 
a progressive social movement and mainstream political party.
Prospects
Most likely Hizbullah not only survived this war, but also enhanced its 
domestic, regional, and international fame. Domestically, it showered 
its supporters with “Iranian” petrodollars and honoured its promise of 
immediately rebuilding the war damages. Also, Hizbullah achieved the 
respect of many Lebanese by agreeing to deploy the army to the south 
and accepting 1701, which would pave the way for discussing not only 
disarmament, but eventually dismantling its military wing once Israel 
relinquishes the Sheba Farms. Regionally and internationally, Hizbullah 
boosted its pan-Arab and pan-Islamic credentials by scoring a victory 
against Israel, a victory unattained by any Arab army. Israel aiming to 
eradicate Hizbullah’s military wing, succeeded only in cutting its tail. 
Hizbullah emerged victorious by shedding off its skin, but keeping its 
body intact. Its capacity for mobilization coupled with its theory of 
martyrdom and religious ideology, on the one hand, and its integra-
tion into the Lebanese public sphere, on the other, serve as guarantees 
to its survival throughout the wind of change.
After the 34-day war in Lebanon, both Israel 
and Hizbullah claimed victory. With over one 
million displaced, 1,300 casualties, many more 
injured, and imperceptible changes in the 
status quo, such victory cries seem out of place. 
Looking beyond strictly military parameters, 
however, Alagha argues that the war resulted 
in greater political prominence of Hizbullah, 
enhanced prestige of its leaders, and even 
increased national integration. 
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Lebanese 
residents stand 
in the rubble of 
their homes in 
southern Beirut, 
16 August 2006.
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